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MONGOLIA’S NON-NUCLEAR STATUS - AN IMPORTANT
ELEMENT OF FOREIGN POLICY
By J. Enkhsaikhan (Mongolia)
Mongolia’s search for security
Since the end of 19th century Mongolia has been trying to regain its lost
independence, exercise its sovereignty and enjoy full independence. In
retrospect, the entire 20th century has been a century of Mongolia’s struggle for
international recognition as an independent state and to exercise full
sovereignty. Thus in 1911 it proclaimed independence from the Manchu dynasty
and declared willingness to establish diplomatic and other forms of relations
not only with its immediate neighbours – Russia and China – but also with
Japan, U.S. and other countries. However due to geo-political realities and
tacitly divided spheres of influence, the major powers were not prepared to
recognize its full independence. Numerous diplomatic demarches and initiatives,
including delegations to Russia, official letters to U.S. and Japan did not bear
fruit. At long last in 1915 Mongolia had to settle for a vague form of autonomy
negotiated between Russia and China and imposed upon Mongolia as a fait
accompli, with some Mongolian territories going to neighbours. The two
neighbours recognized Mongolia as an autonomous part of China under Russia’s
influence. That was the first practical result of its policy of survival as an
independent country. Throughout the past century Mongolia’s security and
independent status was part of or subordinate to Sino-Russian or Sino-Soviet
relations.
It is only with radical changes in Soviet Russia and its external environment
that Mongolia was able to turn to Russia for recognition of sovereignty and to
establish diplomatic relations. Though full diplomatic relations were established
only in early 1950s after China’s recognition of Mongolia, in 1919 Russia
established formal relations with Mongolian nationalists who were planning to
declare full independence from the Manchu dynasty. Russia’s geopolitical
calculations led its government to support Mongolian nationalists in their
resolve to drive the Chinese out of Mongolia and reassert some form of
independence. Though supportive of Mongolian nationalists’ aspirations for
independence from China, the new Russian leaders did not support Mongolia’s
full independence, but rather only close relations with and dependence on
Soviet Russia. Moscow was playing a double game - a policy of duplicity
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explaining Soviet policy of refraining from according full-scale diplomatic
recognition to Mongolia and recognizing its full independence until the end of
World War II.
Thus, though the Soviet Union recognized Mongolian sovereignty, it
exchanged diplomatic representatives only at the level of ‘envoys’ and the first
treaty it concluded in 1921 was not with the Mongolian state, but with the
government in power. Moreover, while supporting Mongolia’s adoption of its
first Constitution, which was co-authored with them, the Soviets were at the
same time secretly negotiating an agreement with China, in which Article Five
stipulated that the Soviet Union “recognizes Outer Mongolia as an integral
part of the Republic of China, and respects China’s sovereignty therein” and
promised to withdraw Soviet troops from Mongolia after negotiations a
forthcoming border conference. The treaty was signed in May, 1925, without
the Soviets officially notifying Mongolia. By doing so, Russia in fact was
trying to impose condominium over sovietized Mongolian puppet state, with
dominating role to be played by Russia.
In the mid-1930s, the Soviets felt surrounded by the Axis Powers, including
by Japan in the East, which had just invaded part of east China and set up a
puppet State of Manchukuo. The Japanese plan was to cut off Russian supplies
in Siberia by invading Mongolia. At that point, Soviet Russia concluded a
bilateral protocol (1936) whereby Russia introduced its troops into Mongolia
to prevent Japanese occupation of Mongolia and parts of Soviet Russia. China
protested against Russia’s conclusion of the protocol with Mongolia,
denouncing it as a gross violation of the 1925 Agreement.
During World War II Mongolia firmly sided with the Soviet Union, and
thus with the Allied Powers, actively and materially contributing to the common
efforts to fight the enemies in Europe and in Asia. As a result of its contribution,
the Allied powers in Yalta in 1945 agreed to recognize Mongolia’s de facto
status quo, provided the Mongolian population supported such a status in a
national referendum. In October 1945 the Mongolian people overwhelmingly
cast their votes in favor of full independence, a fact that the Republic of China
could not ignore. On January 6, 1946 the Executive Yuan of the Republic of
China officially recognized Mongolia and on February 27 the Soviet Union
concluded a treaty of friendship and cooperation with Mongolia, whereby it
officially recognized Mongolia’s full independence. Later that year, the Republic
of China used a border incident as a pretext to renege on its recognition of
Mongolia. When United Nations was established in 1945, Mongolia applied
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for its membership. However due to different excuses by the Republic of China
and the western powers, its application for membership was rejected several
times until 1961.
“Security” amidst ideological dispute
In 1949, when the Communist People’s Republic of China was proclaimed,
Mongolia was one of the first to recognize and establish diplomatic relations
with it and exchange ambassadors. Even establishment of full diplomatic relations
was not enough for the PRC to accept Mongolia’s independent existence.
Externally, Mongolia and the PRC were beginning to develop trade, economic
and cultural relations, while people-to-people exchanges, especially among
Mongolian peoples living on both sides of the state border, were increasing. In
1954 the Chinese leaders secretly approached the Soviets and demanded that
Mongolia be returned to China. The Mongolian leadership, again, learned of
this a few years later when Sino-Soviet rift intensified and both sides began
attacking each other through press and media. By the mid-1950s Mongolia
seemed beginning to enjoy good relations with both of its neighbours and
there was even some economic competition to invest and build in Mongolia.
But it all came to an abrupt halt in early 1960, with both neighbours demanding
Mongolia adhere its ideological line. Mongolia was forced to take sides in the
increasingly ideological dispute, although it had little stake in the debate.
Conscious of past experiences with Russia and China, as well as the amount of
assistance that the Soviet Union could provide, the Mongolian leadership
opted to support Russia. China immediately withdrew its workers and halted
assistance. On the other hand, Mongolia also tried to use the China card to
increase Soviet aid. Soon the Soviet Union increased the volume of its
assistance as well as political pressure to fully and unequivocally back its
position regarding Sino-Soviet dispute, which by that time was turning from
ideological to inter-state, covering all the areas of inter-state relations, including
trade and investment. Following the rise in Sino-Soviet tension, not only did
Soviet troop levels reach 120.000, but also Mongolia’s own armed forces were
doubled. Participation in a possible conflict with China was on the minds of
many Mongolians.
Thus since the early 1960’s until 1989, when Sino-Soviet relations re-
normalized, Mongolia was firmly aligned with the Soviet Union. As an ally, it
had to follow the Soviet line in domestic and foreign policies. As a result, its
trade with China fell below five percent (mostly border trade), while its trade
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with the Soviet Union soared and reached almost ninety percent. In 1966, based
on the renewed alliance treaty, Mongolia allowed Soviet troops to be stationed
on its territory until Sino-Soviet re-normalization. The Soviet troops, some
equipped with weapons of mass destruction, were stationed in Mongolia until
1992. In the late 1960s, when Sino-Soviet conflict was becoming a potential
flashpoint, the Soviets considered the idea of making a pre-emptive nuclear
strike against Chinese nuclear installations and targets, and including the use
of Mongolian territory as forward base. At that time Soviets even unofficially
approached the U.S. regarding its possible reaction to such a pre-emptive strike.
The U.S. did not support that idea, which would have meant that Mongolia
would be spared use as a nuclear pre-emptive launch pad, and if the Chinese
retaliated, as a battleground for nuclear exchanges.
Distant hopes of neutrality
In the mid 1920s, when Mongolian nationalists were debating what kind
of policy to pursue as an independent state, the elite were divided. Some thought
that Mongolia’s destiny was tied to the emerging Soviet State, while others
were more sympathetic with rising Japan. There were also those who thought
that it would be in the country’s interest if it could become permanently neutral
and would not take sides in disputes between the two neighbouring powers –
Russia and China. However, political realities demonstrated that in times of
overt political rivalry among great powers, a small, isolated country could not
survive as an independent country without aligning itself with one of the regional
powers or becoming a member of a regional concert of powers.
During the East-West as well as Sino-Soviet cold wars, Mongolia could
not realistically pursue a neutral foreign policy. The principle that was applied
rigorously was “either you are with us or against us”. The rigorous conditions
set by the realities of the double cold wars began to change at the end of 1980s,
when Sino-Soviet relations began to normalize and Mongolia was able to
normalize relations with both. Also, the United States at last recognized Mongolia
in 1987 which, together with Mongolia’s UN membership and establishment of
diplomatic relations with over twenty countries, has opened the way to redefine
its foreign policy environment.
The changes in international relations in the early 1990s, especially the
disintegration of the Soviet bloc followed by the Soviet Union itself, and resulting
end of the Cold War provided an opportunity for Mongolia, like for many other
countries, to free itself from Soviet influence, redefine its vital national interests
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and foreign policy priorities, and formulate its national security and foreign
policy concepts based on its own interests. These concepts found reflection in
the 1992 new Constitution of Mongolia and later in more detail in 1994 in the
country’s national security and foreign policy concepts.
Basic principles of new foreign policy
Thus Mongolia declared that its foreign policy objectives would in the
future be to ensure its independence and sovereignty by following the trends
of human advancement, and not through social experimentation, that it would
pursue an open, non-aligned foreign policy and avoid past patterns of becoming
overly reliant on any one country or group of countries. Bearing in mind its
own foreign policy objectives and its comparative advantage (mainly
geographical location) it declared that it would give priority to safeguarding its
security and vital national interests primarily by political and diplomatic means
and creating favorable external environment for its economic, scientific and
technological development.
Mindful of its geographical location and historical experience, Mongolia
declared that its priority would continue to be relations with its immediate
neighbours, maintaining a balanced relationship with both and develop all-
round good-neighbourly cooperation, bearing in mind both traditional relations
as well as the specific nature of economic cooperation. The government explained
that maintaining a balanced relationship did not mean keeping equidistance
from them or taking identical positions on all issues, but meant strengthening
trust and developing good-neighbourly relations with both powers. It stated
that when dealing with the neighbours, due account would be taken of their
policies in regard to the vital national interests of Mongolia. It was specifically
emphasized that a policy of non-involvement and neutrality would be pursued
in relation to the disputes that might arise between the two neighbours, unless
they directly affected Mongolia’s national interests, in which case it would
follow its vital interests. Both neighbours welcomed this policy.
Bearing in mind the past experiences with its immediate neighbours or
Soviet bloc countries, Mongolia declared an open foreign policy in 1990. Thus
the second priority of its foreign policy was aimed at developing friendly relations
with highly industrialized developed countries of the West and East. It openly
declared that it would pursue a non-aligned policy as long as it did not threaten
the country’s national vital interests. The third direction was to promote relations
and strengthen its positions in Asia, especially Northeast and Central Asia.
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First steps towards active neutrality
One strength of Mongolia’s policy of neutrality with respect to disputes
of its immediate neighbours lies in the fact that it coincided with the declared
policies of its neighbours. In the early 1990s Russia and China publicly pledged
not to use territories of their neighbours against each other. These commitments
by Russia and China have been welcomed by all their neighbours, as well as
other regional powers and by the international community as a whole. On its
part, when Mongolia concluded treaties of friendly relations and cooperation
with Russia (1993) and China (1994), it pledged not to allow other countries to
use Mongolia’s territory or airspace against interests of third countries, meaning
first of all against their immediate neighbours. In return both neighbours have
expressed support for Mongolia’s independent and balanced foreign policy, as
defined above, especially its commitment not to allow stationing or transit of
weapons of mass destruction through its territory. Mongolia (1992) declared its
territory a single-state nuclear-weapon-free zone as an important part of its
security policy, and as an essential element of ensuring its neutrality in future
Sino-Russian disputes. Currently, this policy enjoys wide support not only of
the neighbours, but also of the region and the world. In 1998 the United Nations
General Assembly1 welcomed “Mongolia’s active and positive role in
developing peaceful, friendly and mutually beneficial relations with the States
of the region and other States” and expressed conviction that “the
internationally recognized status of Mongolia will contribute to enhancing
stability and confidence-building in the region as well as promote Mongolia’s
security by strengthening its independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity,
the inviolability of its borders and the preservation of its ecological balance”.
The Assembly further endorsed and supported “Mongolia’s good-neighbourly
and balanced relationship with its neighbours as an important element of
strengthening regional peace, security and stability”.
General Assembly Resolution 53/77 D mentioned above has demonstrated
not only recognition of the international status of Mongolia. It also showed
that its foreign policy has matured to a degree that its policy of neutrality and
non-involvement is recognized as an important element of strengthening
regional peace, security and stability. This international recognition lays the
foundations of further expanding Mongolia’s policy of neutrality beyond Sino-
Russian disputes or other Sino-Russian relations, that is could cover relations
with other countries of the region, especially relations with the regional powers.
1 See United Nations General Assembly resolution 53/77 D adopted 4 December 1998
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Emerging relations in the post Cold War Asia
After the end of the Cold War the bipolar world has turned into one of a
unipolarity. The U.S. is the sole superpower, whose influence is felt everywhere.
Nevertheless this unipolar world cannot be sustained longer. New regional
powers are on the rise that are not only questioning this unipolarity, but would
try to redraw the political and economic map, redistribute power and influence
and will compete for regional influence and dominance. This will lead to open
competition, rivalry and discord among influential and emerging powers.
Ascendance of China as a potential pre-eminent economic, political and military
power is one of the clearest emerging realities of today’s Asia. That is why not
only regional but also world powers are courting China. The main debate about
China is how much longer would it be a status quo power and when and how it
would assert its power, whether or when would it use its growing economic,
political and military power to assert its territorial and historical claims for
hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region, as it tried prematurely during the Great
Proletarian Cultural Revolution four decades ago. Mongolians are also trying
to foresee Chinese general policies towards its neighbours, especially Mongolia.
China is not the only rising power in Asia. There are other traditional and
newly emerging regional powers, such as Japan, the Republic of Korea,
Indonesia, India and Russia that are pursuing their policies to partially
accommodate to the Chinese where necessary and to compete where and when
they can. There is growing competition among them as well. In this dual policy
of cooperation and competition, emerging manifestations of neo-cold war and
collusion of strategic and economic interests of the major and emerging powers
in Asia, smaller countries, as during the Cold War, would soon be forced to take
sides. In Mongolia’s case it could soon be asked or expected to follow either
Russia (where most of its economic and energy interests lie, and which does
not harbor territorial claims over Mongolia), China (where its trade, economic,
investment and trade infrastructure interests lie most), Japan (where its
technology and possible investment are most welcome), the Republic of Korea
(whose trade, technology and medium-size investment interests are also
welcome, and where of thousands of Mongolian immigrant workers bring in
hard currency to Mongolia) or the United States (the world’s foremost power
whose democratic values Mongolians share) or a coalition of states.
Therefore Mongolia’s policy of neutrality and non-involvement in regard
to Sino-Russian disputes which do not directly affect Mongolia’s vital interests,
needs to be formally expanded to include not only some other Sino-Russian
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issues but also embrace its relations with other regional powers. The emerging
realities of competition and confrontation among Asian powers demand that
Mongolia maintain good-neighbourly relations with all of them and thus pursue
a policy of active neutrality, which would be understood and accepted by all
the major powers. When declaring such a policy, it needs to underline, like in
the case with Russia and China, that it would pursue the policy of active
neutrality as long as that policy does not affect its vital national interests, and
that in the latter case it would follow its vital interests. This internationally
recognized and supported foreign policy of Mongolia could be best reflected
and defined in its emerging and widely recognized nuclear-weapon-free status.
Essence of the nuclear-weapon-free status
Mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-free status is essentially an expression of its
rejection of nuclear policies of great powers and of nuclear proliferation, and at
the same time a manifestation of its desire for neutrality and non-involvement
in nuclear power rivalries or calculations of not only Russia and China, but of
all nuclear-weapon states. When Mongolia’s single-state NWFZ status would
be internationally recognized and legally guaranteed, it would in fact define its
internationally accepted regime with all the benefits that come with NWFZ
status, including security assurances more rigid than NPT verification regimes,
support in peaceful uses of nuclear energy and science, etc. As such, it could
also serve as an example for other states which, due to their geographical or
geopolitical location, cannot form part of traditional (i.e. group) NWFZs. At
present there is still hesitancy on the part of some nuclear-weapon states to
accept in principle the notion and concept of single-state NWFZ, since they
believe that that would detract from or undermine the incentive for establishing
traditional (group) NWFZs. However, there are real-life cases when a state
cannot, due to its geographical location or for some geo-political considerations
form part of a traditional NWFZ. There are also cases when a regional NWFZ
cannot be established due to the fact that some potential states are either under
nuclear umbrella of a nuclear-weapon state and enjoy “umbrella” protection,
while others cannot, or some enjoy the protection of alliance relations, while
others do not.
Mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-free status – an important part of it security
The right of any country to ensure its security without undermining the
security of others is a well recognized fact. That especially applies to nuclear
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security issues. For this reason the 1975 “U.N. comprehensive study on the
question of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all its aspects” pointed out that
“obligations relating to the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones may
be assumed not only by groups of states, including entire continents or large
geographical regions, but also by small groups of states and even individual
countries (emphasis added).2 Furthermore, in 1976 the U.N. General Assembly
expressed the hope that the foregoing study – together with the subsequent
views, observations, and suggestions offered on it – would further enhance
whatever efforts a country or countries may take concerning NWFZs and be
useful in the establishment of such zones.3 Mongolia is not the only one that
cannot benefit from regional (traditional) NWFZs. There are other states that
because of their geographic or geo-political location, or for political or any
other reason cannot form part of regional/traditional NWFZs. Such countries
like Nepal, Afghanistan, Austria, Cyprus, Ukraine, Byelorussia, Malta, Japan or
even two Koreas have difficulties in forming part of a regional NWFZ. Under
certain conditions even Israel might choose to opt for a non-traditional NWFZ
in the Middle East pending the final resolution of the basic disputes with its
immediate and other neighbours.
The past decade has amply demonstrated that the time of creation of
“easy” NWFZs is almost over and that establishing of NWFZs in Central
Europe, the Middle East, South Asia or Northeast Asia would need more
innovative and imaginative approach than the previous ones, if they succeed.
The reason is that these proposed zones touch upon the interests of nuclear
powers, have disputes among each other, some of them would need actual
withdrawal of nuclear weapons, dismantling or destruction of nuclear-weapon
weapons or their infrastructure. In the Northeast Asian case, not only some
states have competing strategic interests, but some also have foreign military
bases and nuclear umbrella. That is why United Nations 1999 guidelines on the
establishment of NWFZs on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among
the states of the region concerned4 cannot be easily applied and therefore
needs to be revised to allow for and reflect the challenges that the above-
mentioned proposed zones encounter. Furthermore, the 1999 guidelines did
2 See UNGO, 30 th  Session. Official Records. Document no. 27A (A/10027/add.1, p.31).
The resolution “Comprehensive Study on the Question of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones in
All its Aspects” as adopted on 10 December, 1976
3 See paragraph 8 of UNGA Resolution 31/70.
4 See document A/51/182/Rev. 1 of 9 June 1999 (pp.71-77)
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not address the issue of creation of single-state NWFZs. The guidelines only
made reference that “owing to its unique geographical circumstances, Mongolia
has declared its nuclear-weapon-free status in order to promote its security.”
This status was welcomed by the General Assembly in its consensus resolution
53/77 D of 4 December 1998.” At that time the nuclear powers thought that
Mongolia would most probably the only exception. But as recent events clearly
demonstrate, Mongolia is not at all and will not be the only exceptional case.
Even the issues of de-nuclearization of DPRK or peacefully addressing the
Iranian case would need an innovative and flexible approach.
Criticism that creation of single-state NWFZs would detract from or
undermine the incentives for establishing traditional (group) NWFZs is
unconvincing and in fact un-productive. It discriminates against individual
states and violates their right to ensure security through political and legal
means. As the saying goes, in most cases the security lies in numbers and not
vice versa. Therefore single states need more assurances than groups of states.
As a result of Mongolia’s adoption (2000) of a law defining its nuclear-
weapon-free status, and the diplomatic negotiations held during 1997-2000, the
five nuclear weapon states (P5) made a joint statement (October 2000) providing
political security assurances to Mongolia. However Mongolia and many other
countries declared that political assurances were not sufficient to institutionalize
Mongolia’s status. Therefore the P5 non-governmental experts, Mongolia and
representatives of the United Nations met in Sapporo to address the issue of
Mongolia’s status and recommended that in order to make the status more
credible and legally based, Mongolia and its two neighbours, or Mongolia and
all P5, needed to conclude an agreement institutionalizing that status. The
experts all agreed that the main provisions of NWFZ treaties could be mutatis
mutandis reflected in the agreement, reflecting at the same time the geopolitical
nuances and realities. On the basis of the Sapporo recommendations, the
Mongolian side has approached its neighbours with the proposal to conclude
such an agreement, to which they agreed in principle.
Challenges to creating a NEA-NWFZ
Changes occurring in the post Cold War period are most dramatic in
Northeast Asia, which, after the 1997 financial crisis, is resuming its dynamism
and is again becoming a natural focal point of the major powers. Today no one
doubts that the situation in Northeast Asia and relations among the countries
of the region are of great importance for world peace, security and stability. At
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the same time it is still the region of the world that lacks collective security
arrangement or mechanism. Bilateral and trilateral relations, especially among
the great powers, remain the bedrocks of peace and stability in the region.
Denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, as wll as other traditional and
newly emerging security issues of the region, need forms of dialogue,
confidence-building and cooperation. There are many ideas and proposals,
starting from developing a permanent mechanism of dialogue at the
governmental level on non-political and non-controversial issues to initiating
government-level regional security talks. There are also different views
concerning the number of states that need to be involved and whether an extra-
regional power should be included. Since analysis of different proposals needs
a separate study of its own, I would focus only on the proposals aimed at
turning the Northeast Asian region into a NWFZ (NEA-NWFZ). Such proposals
have been put forward by many, including the states of the region such as the
DPRK. There have been proposals to create such a zone on the basis of the
formula “Three Plus Three”, in reference to two Koreas, Japan plus U.S., China
and Russia. A modified version of the proposal adds Mongolia as the seventh
party. There is a proposal to create a “limited” NWFZ, which would include
some parts of China, Russia and the United states. As a first step to creating
such a zone it is proposed that the non-nuclear states of the region create a
league of Non-Nuclear states. However, as of today none of the regional states
officially propose establishment of the zone, recognizing that its creation would
be most difficult since strategic interests of the three of the five nuclear-weapon
states overlap, some have alliance commitments and are being provided with
“nuclear umbrella” by their ally. There is still deep distrust among some the
members of the region dating from past history which needs to be adequately
addressed.
It is clear that denuclearization of the Koran peninsula is sine qua non for
establishing a NEA-NWFZ. Without successfully addressing the North Korean
nuclear issue, it will be impossible to create an atmosphere conducive to serious
multilateral negotiations. Such issues as withdrawal of U.S. nuclear umbrella
from Japan and the Republic of Korea will have far-reaching effects on the
region. On the other hand, disregarding this and other hard core issues would
only stall the real talks.
Addressing the sensitive issue of DPRK’s nuclear program needs
appropriate setting and agreed “rules of the game”. The four party talks have
proven to be inadequate. The six party talks underway under the stewardship
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of China seems to be more productive, though there is still no guarantee that
the talks could be successful in the near future. However, since it is the only
inter-governmental mechanism that is trying to address, if not solve, the Korean
nuclear and related issues, it needs to be supported in every way, i.e. politically
and organizationally. The research work undertaken by the Institute for Foreign
Policy Analysis, Inc. in association with the Fletcher School (Tufts University)
has raised pertinent questions regarding the structure, capacity, obstacles and
other factors that the talks are or will be encountering. At the same time the
study shows that with right attitude and patient approach the six party talks
could yield results and might even form the basis of the future Northeast Asian
security and dialogue mechanism.
Since most issues of Northeast Asia denuclearization are inter-connected
the hard issues of confidence, nuclear umbrella, security assurances, other
“inducements”, return to and role of NPT and IAEA, Japan’s surplus plutonium
issue, etc. need to be addressed. Since NEA-NWFZ cannot be established
quickly and easily, intermediate measures and steps will be required and should
address the difficult issues, while simultaneously promote confidence among
the parties to the talks. One of such measures could be creation of separate
single-state NWFZs5 by some of the countries of the region, which would take
them out from under the nuclear umbrella and at the same time provide them
with the needed general security assurances that are usually provided by the
nuclear-weapon states to NWFZs (until a full-fledged NEA-NWFZ is
established). On the other hand the party that is not under any nuclear umbrella
could also be provided with general security assurances as a single-state NWFZ
that could perhaps include assurances from use or threat of conventional force.
This way the parties could level the playing field and promote confidence.
Leveling the playing field has an important role to play not only in improving
the atmosphere at the talks, but also in reaching mutually acceptable
understanding or resolution. In this connection the Northeast Asian Regional
Action Agenda, adopted in February 2005 has underlined that “Mongolia’s
5  The obligations would inc lude non- acquisition of nuclear weapons or assistance in
acquisition, rigid and mutually agreed safeguards and export-control restrictions, non-sta-
tioning of nuclear weapons or parts thereof or non-transit through its territory, positive and
negative security assurances from nuclear-weapon states and perhaps conventional security
assurances from the neighboring states. The issues of possible visits of nuclear capable ships
and aircraft and some other issues could be mutually agreed. States with nuclear-weapons
could commit not to contribute to any act which might constitute a violation of the single-
State NWFZ status.
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NWFS could provide an example of a political and realistic approach in addressing
nuclear issues involving individual states.”
The six party talks are the only inter-governmental talks aimed at
addressing the Korean nuclear issues. However, instructions of government
delegations tend to be somewhat rigid. It is therefore important that civil society
organizations (CSOs) of the countries of the region work both with their
governments to induce them to be more flexible as well as among themselves to
propose bold, yet reasonable ideas that could help bring closer the positions of
parties to the talks. Thus for example a model Northeast Asian nuclear weapon-
free zone treaty has been elaborated by an independent peace research institute
called Peace Depot a few years ago that could serve as a good basis to discuss
the possible structure and main elements of the NWFZ. Also CSOs could
undertake analysis of the positions of governments with regard to the hard
core issues, the political, social and even psychological/ideological obstacles,
organize workshops to encourage more bold and innovative thinking. Working
at the national level, CSOs could also put pressure on governments either
through NGO advocacy or awareness raising activities, carrying out polls, or
even proposing face-saving solutions to successfully address the issues. It is
for this reason that Northeast Asian Conflict Prevention Network of GPPAC
has expressed its intention to launch a Civil Society Forum in parallel to the Six-
party talks and pursue innovative and flexible approaches that are needed for
the realization of NEA-NWFZ. This initiative needs the fullest support. Perhaps
this civil society forum could turn into an effective, vocal and influential
movement for the establishment of NEA-NWFZ that could find a way to form a
true partnership with governments and become as effective and successful as
the Nobel Prize winning International Campaign to Ban Landmines.
